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Sovereign defaults have occurred more frequently in emerging countries and accompany 
significant currency depreciation and high inflation. The standard model of sovereign 
default cannot necessarily explain these facts sufficiently. In this paper, I examine the root 
cause of sovereign default on the basis of a model of inflation that is built on a micro-
foundation of government behavior and conclude that the root cause of sovereign default 
is an insufficiently independent central bank. Without a sufficiently independent central 
bank, the government inevitably borrows money excessively, and as a result, inflation and 
currency depreciation accelerate. This situation will frustrate and anger the population, 
and the government may then declare a sovereign default in an attempt to place the blame 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Models of sovereign default mostly rely on the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), 
which explains the mechanism of a sovereign default by incorporating the cost or penalty 
of default into the model (Kletzer and Wright, 2000; Neumeyer and Fabrizio, 2005; 
Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008; Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009, 2019; Yue, 2010; 
Auclert, 2016; Ayres et al., 2018; Bianchi et al., 2018). In these models, the costs of 
sovereign default and the credit ceiling for a government are endogenously determined. 
The amount of money a government borrows is the minimum of the amount it wishes to 
borrow and its credit ceiling. If some exogenous shock (e.g., the oil crisis in the 1970s) 
occurs, however, the government may be driven into a situation in which it is better for it 
to choose the option of sovereign default.  
 The model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is very useful for analyzing the 
borrowing behavior of the government of a sovereign country, but it is not as useful when 
examining the root cause of sovereign default. First, it largely depends on exogenous 
shocks as the cause of sovereign default. Therefore, if a government (whether that of an 
emerging or developed country) and lenders behave rationally, a sovereign default cannot 
occur unless an unexpected exogenous shock such as the oil crisis in the 1970s occurs. 
This implies that the root cause of sovereign default is more or less bad luck. However, if 
bad luck is indeed the root cause, why have sovereign defaults occurred far more 
frequently, and in some cases repeatedly, in emerging countries than they have in 
developed countries? Are emerging countries far more unlucky than developed countries? 
 Clearly, some important heterogeneities with regard to sovereign default must 
exist between emerging and developed countries. Indeed, many models based on Eaton 
and Gersovitz (1981) attribute the frequent occurrences of sovereign default in emerging 
countries to the high levels of economic volatility in these countries (Neumeyer and 
Fabrizio, 2005; Arellano, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2019). 
That is, the economies of emerging countries are more vulnerable than those of developed 
countries; therefore, they are more severely affected by shocks than developed countries. 
However, if lenders and the governments of emerging countries are aware of this 
vulnerability and the higher risks of sovereign default, they should behave rationally in 
expecting and considering these risks. Therefore, sovereign default should still occur only 
when a large unexpected exogenous shock occurs. The question of why sovereign defaults 
have occurred far more frequently in emerging countries than developed countries 
therefore remains unanswered. Furthermore, Tomz and Wright (2007) showed 
empirically that the relationship between sovereign default and real economic activities 
is surprisingly weak, which implies that a sovereign default can emerge regardless of 
external circumstances (i.e., bad luck). 
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 As second problem is that the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) ignores 
currency depreciation and inflation. Usually, a sovereign default is accompanied by 
significant currency depreciation and high inflation. The occurrence of these phenomena 
seems to be very natural because the government of a country in default has borrowed a 
large amount of money denominated in foreign currencies from foreign lenders. That is, 
sovereign default is very closely related to exchange rates and consequently also to 
domestic inflation. Nevertheless, the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) does not 
incorporate prices, and all variables are expressed in real terms. Hence, by its very nature, 
the model cannot explain currency depreciation and domestic inflation. 
 Uribe (2006) emphasized the roles of prices and exchange rates in sovereign 
default, particularly the importance of regimes of monetary and fiscal policies and their 
effects on price level. Uribe (2006) showed that the risk of sovereign default will greatly 
differ depending on monetary-fiscal regimes (see also Schabert, 2010), meaning that a 
sovereign default can emerge regardless of exogenous shocks, depending on the 
monetary-fiscal regime. However, in the model of Uribe (2006), the behavior of 
government is set ad hoc; that is, there is no micro-foundation for government behavior. 
In addition, the behaviors of government and the central bank are not separated; therefore, 
it is unclear why and how a specific monetary-fiscal regime is chosen by the combined 
government/central bank entity.  
 In this paper, I examine the cause of sovereign default on the basis of the model 
of inflation presented by Harashima (2004, 20061, 2007a, 2007b2, 2007c3, 2008a, 2008b4, 
2013a, 2019a5 , 2019b). The model was built on a micro-foundation of government 
behavior, and the government and central bank are fully separated and therefore are 
treated as completely different entities. The conclusion derived from the model is 
common to that in Uribe (2006) in the sense that a sovereign default can emerge not only 
as a result of an exogenous shock but also from inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies. 
The models differ, however, in that the behaviors of the government and central bank are 
fully separated, and a micro-foundation of government behavior is incorporated in the 
proposed model. 
 I show that the root cause of sovereign default is that the central bank is not 
sufficiently independent. The preferences of the government and representative 
household are intrinsically heterogeneous. If these heterogeneous preferences are not 
modified, the government will borrow an excessive amount of money, motivated by its 
own intrinsic preferences. The model indicates that these heterogeneous preferences 
                                                   
1 Harashima (2006) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2016). 
2 Harashima (2007b) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2013b). 
3 Harashima (2007c) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2018a). 
4 Harashima (2008b) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2020a). 
5 Harashima (2019a) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2019c). 
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result in accelerations of currency depreciation and domestic inflation. These conditions 
will frustrate and anger the citizens. Under these conditions, some governments may 
choose the option of sovereign default because they can place the blame on foreigners 
(i.e., the lenders), at least temporarily. 
 To escape accelerating currency depreciation and inflation, the preferences of the 
government and representative household must be made identical, but this is not an easy 
task because preferences are not easily controlled by oneself. An independent third-party 
institution (in this case, a central bank) is needed to force the government to change its 
preferences so that they are identical to those of the representative household. If the 
central bank is not sufficiently independent, the government cannot stop borrowing 
excessively, and currency depreciation and inflation will continue to accelerate. In this 
case, if a government has borrowed money from foreign lenders, sovereign default is an 
option for the government to at least temporarily escape this situation. That is, a sovereign 
default can emerge without an exogenous shock. In addition, the model in this paper 
clearly shows that sovereign defaults and accelerations of currency depreciation and 
domestic inflation are closely related and inseparable.  
The root cause of sovereign default is therefore an insufficiently independent 
central bank. It seems likely that central banks of many emerging countries are less 
independent than those of developed countries (see e.g. Cukierman et al., 1992), and 
therefore the model predicts that the probabilities of sovereign default in emerging 
countries will be higher than developed countries.  
 
2  EXCHANGE RATE 
 
2.1  Floating exchange rate 
Suppose that there are two countries (Countries 1 and 2) that use different currencies, and 
a floating exchange rate system is adopted between them. Let 𝜒𝑡 be the depreciation rate 
of currency of Country 2 to that of Country 1 in period t. Note that a negative value of 𝜒𝑡 
means that the currency of Country 2 appreciates relative to that of Country 1. 
  Suppose for simplicity that the exchange rate is kept identical to the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) between the two countries, and therefore 
 𝜋2,𝑡 = 𝜒𝑡 + 𝜋1,𝑡                                                     (1) 
 
is always held, where 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 is the inflation rate of Country i in period t for i = 1 or 2. 
 
2.2  An exchange rate model under the RTP-based procedure 
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2.2.1  The model  
Households are usually assumed to act such that they maximize their expected utilities 
discounted by the rate of time preference (RTP) on the basis of rational expectations. I 
refer to this behavior as the RTP-based procedure, and it is equivalent to the MDC 
(Maximum degree of comfortability)-based procedure that is explained in Section 2.3. 
 Suppose that Countries 1 and 2 are identical except for the RTPs of government 
and the representative household and that they commonly behave under the RTP-based 
procedure. Both countries are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and capital 
are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each country. All variables 
are expressed in per capita terms.  
 Let 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 and 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 be the RTP of the government and a representative household 
of Country i, respectively. It is assumed for simplicity that 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃 for any i where 𝜃𝑃 
is a constant (i.e., the values of 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 are identical between the two countries), but this 
assumption can easily be relaxed and the essential results are the same regardless of this 
assumption because of the concept of sustainable heterogeneity (SH) discussed in Section 
5.1 (see Harashima, 20106, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017b7). Unlike 𝜃𝑃,𝑖, the values of 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 
are assumed to be heterogeneous between the two countries. 
 
2.2.1.1  The average nominal interest rate for total government bonds 
A government borrows money by issuing government bonds, and the returns on the 
government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds during a unit period, for 
example, a year. Government bonds are redeemed in a unit period, and the government 
successively refinances the bonds by issuing new ones in each time period.  
 Lenders in Country i will buy the government bonds if 
 ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋𝑖,𝑠+𝑟𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 
 
in period t, where ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 is the nominal interest rate for government bonds bought by 
lenders in Country i in the currency of Country i, 𝑟𝑡 is the real interest rate in period t, 
and 𝐸𝑡  is the expectation operator. The real interest rate rt is common to the two 
countries because capital is freely transacted between them. By arbitrage in markets, ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 
is determined as  
 
                                                   
6 Harashima (2010) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2017a). 
7 Harashima (2017b) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2020b). 
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?̅?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋𝑖,𝑠+𝑟𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 .                                           (2) 
 
 Here, by equation (2),  
 ?̅?1,𝑡 = ?̅?2,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋1,𝑠 − 𝜋2,𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 .                                   (3) 
 
By equations (2) and (3),  
 ?̅?2,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋1,𝑠 − 𝜋2,𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 = 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋1,𝑠+𝑟𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 .                    (4) 
 
By equations (1) and (4),  
 ?̅?2,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∫ 𝜒𝑠𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 + 𝐸𝑡 ∫ (𝜋1,𝑠+𝑟𝑠)𝑡+1𝑡 𝑑𝑠 .                             (5) 
 
 Since government bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively 
refinanced, the bonds the government holds at t have been issued between t – 1 and t. 
Hence, the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds of Country 2 at time t 
(𝑅2,𝑡) is the weighted sum of ?̅?2,𝑡 such that 
 𝑅2,𝑡 = ∫ ?̅?2,𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ( ?̅?2,𝑠,𝑡∫ ?̅?2,v,𝑡𝑑v𝑡𝑡−1 ) 𝑑𝑠 
 
where ?̅?2,𝑠,𝑡 is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued by the government 
of Country 2 at time s. Combining this equation with equation (5), 
 𝑅2,𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v ( ?̅?2,𝑠,𝑡∫ ?̅?2,v,𝑡𝑑v𝑡𝑡−1 ) 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 +  ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v ( ?̅?2,𝑠,𝑡∫ ?̅?2,v,𝑡𝑑v𝑡𝑡−1 ) 𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1  . 
 
If the weights  
 ?̅?2,𝑠,𝑡∫ ?̅?2,v,𝑡𝑑v𝑡𝑡−1  
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between t –1 and t are somewhat similar, then approximately 
 𝑅2,𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1             (6) 
 
(see Harashima, 2007c, 2008b). Therefore, the average nominal interest rate for Country 
2’s government bonds is determined by equation (6). 
 
2.2.1.2  The government budget constraint 
The budget constraint of the government of Country i is 
  ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
where Bi,t is total nominal government bonds, Ri,t is the nominal interest rate for 
government bonds, Gi,t is nominal government expenditure, Xi,t is nominal tax revenue, 
and Si,t is the nominal amount of seigniorage of Country i at time t for i = 1 or 2. For 
simplicity, a lump-sum tax is assumed.  
 Let 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , g𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , x𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , and s𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , where pi,t is the price 
level of Country i at time t . In addition, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 . By dividing by pi,t, the budget 
constraint of the government of Country i is transformed to  
  ?̇?𝑖,𝑡𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
which is equivalent to  
 ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑡(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡) + g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 .                               (7) 
 
By equations (1) and (7), 
 ?̇?2,𝑡 = 𝑏2,𝑡(𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜒𝑡 − 𝜋1,𝑡) + g2,𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑡 − 𝑠2,𝑡 .                         (8) 
 
Note that 𝜋1,𝑡 in equation (8) is an exogenous variable for the government of Country 2. 
 
2.2.1.3  Optimization of a government’s behavior  
The government of Country i maximizes its expected utility  
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 𝐸0 ∫ 𝑢𝐺,𝑖∞0 (g𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥𝑖,𝑡) exp(−𝜃𝐺,𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to its budget constraint (i.e., equation [7]), satisfying equation (6), where 𝑢𝐺,𝑖 is 
the utility function of the government of Country i. The government maximizes its 
expected utility considering the behavior of the representative household reflected in Ri,t 
in its budget constraint.  
 
2.2.1.4  Optimization of the representative household’s behavior  
Consider a model based on Sidrauski’s (1967) well-known model of money in the utility 
function such that the representative household of Country i maximizes its expected 
utility 
 𝐸0 ∫ 𝑢𝑃,𝑖(𝑐𝑖,𝑡, 𝑚𝑖,𝑡)∞0 exp(−𝜃𝑃,𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
  ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡) − [𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + (𝜋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡)𝑚𝑖,𝑡] − g𝑖,𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑢𝑃,𝑖 is the utility function of the representative household of Country i, and ci,t is 
real consumption, mi,t is real money, wi,t is real wage, ai,t is wealth of the representative 
household, and σi,t is lump-sum real government transfers of Country i in period t. In 
addition, ai,t = ki,t + mi,t, where ki,t is real capital.  
 It is assumed that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑓′(𝑘𝑖,𝑡), 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝑓′(𝑘𝑖,𝑡), 𝜕𝑢𝑃,𝑖(𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑚𝑖,𝑡)𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡 >0 , 𝜕2𝑢𝑃,𝑖(𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑚𝑖,𝑡)𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡2 < 0 , 𝜕𝑢𝑃,𝑖(𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑚𝑖,𝑡)𝜕𝑚𝑖,𝑡 > 0 , and 𝜕2𝑢𝑃,𝑖(𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝑚𝑖,𝑡)𝜕𝑚𝑖,𝑡2 < 0 , where f (·) is the 
production function. Population is assumed to be constant.  
 
2.2.2  The law of motion for the exchange rate 
By the optimization of the representative household,  
 𝜃𝑃,2 = 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟                             (9) 
 
holds at steady state such that ?̇?𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑡 = 0 where r is constant. 
 Next consider the optimization of the government of Country 2, keeping in mind 
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that 𝜋1,𝑡 in equation (8) (i.e., the budget constraint of the government of Country 2) is 
an exogenous variable for the government of Country 2. By the optimization,  
 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜒𝑡                                                    (10) 
 
at steady state such that ġ2,𝑡 = 0, ẋ2,𝑡 = 0, ṡ2,𝑡 = 0, ?̇?2,𝑡 = 0, and ?̇?2,𝑡 = 0. Hence, by 
equations (6) and (10), 
 𝜃𝐺,2 = ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜒𝑡 .               (11) 
 
Here, because 𝑟t = 𝑟 = constant at steady state as shown in equation (9),  
 ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑟 + ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1             (12) 
 
at steady state such that ċ2,𝑡 = 0 and k̇2,𝑡 = 0. Hence, by equations (11) and (12), 
 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝑟 + ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜒𝑡 .                  (13) 
 
By equations (9) and (13), 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜒𝑡 + 𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2 − ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1            (14) 
 
at steady state such that ġ2,𝑡 = 0, ẋ2,𝑡 = 0, ṡ2,𝑡 = 0, ?̇?2,𝑡 = 0, ?̇?2,𝑡 = 0, ċ2,𝑡 = 0, and 
k̇2,𝑡 = 0. Equation (14) indicates the law of motion for the exchange rate under the RTP-
based procedure. 
 A solution of integral equation (14) is  
 𝜒𝑡 = 𝜒0 + 6 (𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2 − ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ) exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] .             (15) 
 
If 𝜋1,v = 0 and 𝜒𝑡  satisfies equation (14) for 0 ≤ 𝑡 and −∞ < 𝜒𝑡 ≤ ∞ for −1 <𝑡 ≤ 1, then  
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lim𝑡→∞ 𝜒𝑡 = 𝜒0 + 6(𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2)𝑡2                                       (16) 
 
(see Harashima, 2008b).  
 
2.3  A model of the exchange rate under the MDC-based 
procedure 
2.3.1  Procedure based on the maximum degree of comfortability 
(MDC) 
Before constructing a model of exchange rate under the MDC-based procedure, I explain 
the MDC-based procedure briefly following Harashima (2018b8, 2019e, 2020c, 2021). 
 
2.3.1.1  “Comfortability” with the capital-wage ratio (CWR) 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household should first subjectively evaluate the value 
of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  (the capital-wage ratio; CWR), where ?̆?𝑡  and ?̆?𝑡  are the kt and wt of the 
household, respectively. Let Γ be the subjective valuation of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  by a household and Γj 
be the value of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  of household j (j = 1, 2, 3, … ). Each household assesses whether it 
feels comfortable with its current Γ (i.e., its combination of income and capital expressed 
by CWR). Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. For each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃? be a 
household’s state at which its DOC is the maximum (MDC) and 𝛤(?̃?) be a household’s 
Γ when it is at ?̃?. 𝛤(?̃?) indicates the Γ, at which a household reaches its MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑗) is household j’s Γj when it is at ?̃?𝑗.  
 Household j acts according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household j feels that the current Γj is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑗), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any j.  
Rule 1-2: If household j feels that the current Γj is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑗), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γj is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑗) for any j. 
 
 Harashima (2018b, 2019e, 2020c, 2021) showed that if households behave 
according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, they can reach the same steady state as they reach under 
                                                   
8 Harashima (2018b) is also available in Japanese as Harashima (2019d). 
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the RTP-based procedure. This means that the MDC-based and RTP-based procedures 
function equivalently and that CWR at MDC can be substituted for RTP as a guide for 
household behavior. The essential results are the same even if households are 
heterogeneous in 𝛤(?̃?𝑗) (see Harashima, 2018b, 2019e, 2020c, 2021). 
 
2.3.1.2  Household MDC 
Let 𝛤(?̃?𝑖,𝑗) be 𝛤(?̃?𝑗) in Country i. Suppose that all households in Country i are identical, 
and therefore 𝛤(?̃?𝑖,𝑗) is identical for any household j in Country i. Let 𝛤(?̃?𝑖,𝑗), which is 
identical for any household j in Country i, be 𝛤𝑃,𝑖. Here, it is assumed for simplicity that 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 is identical for any i (i.e., the value of 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 is identical for any country), but this 
assumption can easily be relaxed and the essential results are the same regardless of this 
assumption because SH will still be achieved (Harashima, 2018b, 2019e, 2020c, 2021). 
 The production function in Country i is assumed to be Harrod neutral such that 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼, where A (technology) and α (0 < α < 1) are constant and common to all 
countries. Hence,  
 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡  .                                          (17) 
 
Production (yi,t) is distributed by  
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝜕𝑘𝑖,𝑡 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 .                               (18) 
 
By equations (17) and (18), 
 𝑤𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑟𝑡 .                                                (19) 
 
 As shown in Section 3.2.1.1, if household MDC is achieved under the MDC-
based procedure,  
  𝛤𝑃,𝑖 = 𝛤(?̃?𝑖,𝑗) = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡  .                                             (20) 
 
Therefore, by equations (19) and (20), 
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𝛤𝑃,𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑟𝑡 
 
is satisfied at household MDC (i.e., at steady state) such that ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 0. 
Because 𝑟𝑡 is constant at steady state (i.e., 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟), as indicated by equation (9), then  
 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑟 .                                                 (21) 
 
Note that by equation (21), 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 is constant. 
 Note also that under the RTP-based procedure,    
 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑟                                             (22) 
 
at steady state such that ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 0. Therefore, by equations (21) and (22), 
 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 .                                                   (23) 
 
2.3.1.3  The government’s MDC  
The value of  
 − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡  
 
is constant at steady state such that ġ𝑖,𝑡 = 0, ẋ𝑖,𝑡 = 0, ṡ𝑖,𝑡 = 0, and ?̇?𝑖,𝑡 = 0. At this 
steady state, the government’s MDC should be satisfied because it is the steady state that 
the government wants and has successfully managed to achieve. Let  
 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡 ( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)                 (24) 
 
at MDC of the government of Country i (i.e., at steady state). Because − g𝑖,𝑡−𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑡  
at the government’s MDC and α are constant, 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 is constant. In addition, 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 indicates 
the most comfortable combination of net revenues −(g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡) and debts (bi,t), 
whereas MDC indicates the state at which the combination of revenues and assets is felt 
to be most comfortable. In this sense, 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 can be seen as a parameter that indicates the 
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preference of government concerning its MDC. Unlike 𝛤𝑃,𝑖, it is assumed that the values 
of 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 are heterogeneous across countries. 
 On the other hand, as shown in Harashima (2006, 2019e), the value of − g𝑖,𝑡−𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑡  indicates the rate of increase of the government’s real obligation to pay 
for the return of its bonds; therefore,  
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡  .                                    (25) 
 
 Note that Harashima (2006, 2019e) has shown that under the RTP-based 
procedure,  
 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡                                             (26) 
 
holds at steady state for a given value of 𝜃𝐺,𝑖. By equations (24) and (26), therefore, 
  𝛤𝐺,𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 .                                               (27) 
 
2.3.1.4  The law of motion for inflation under the MDC-based procedure 
Before examining the open-economy case, for comparison, I examine the closed-
economy case such that Country i is isolated from other countries. In this case, the 
government of Country i behaves so as to achieve and keep equation (24); that is, by 
equations (24) and (25), the government acts to achieve and maintain  
  𝛤𝐺,𝑖 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 . 
 
In other words, the government of Country i behaves so as to make the rate of increase of 
its real obligation 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡  
 
equal to 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 (1−𝛼𝛼 ). On the other hand, the representative household of Country i behaves 
so as to achieve and maintain equation (21). 
 Harashima (2019e) showed that, because of the government’s and representative 
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household’s behaviors under the MDC-based procedure, inflation in Country i develops 
according to  
  ∫ ∫ 𝜋v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,𝑖 − 𝛤𝑃,𝑖) . 
 
2.3.2  The model  
Suppose that there are two countries (Countries 1 and 2) that are identical except for 𝛤𝐺,𝑖. 
Suppose also that the government of Country 2 borrows money by issuing government 
bonds denominated in the currency of Country 1 from lenders in Country 1. In this case, 
lenders in Country 1 buy the bonds from (i.e., lend money to) the government of Country 
2 if the nominal interest rate of the government bond is set equal to or exceeds the nominal 
interest rate in Country 1 (𝑅1,𝑡). Therefore, by arbitrage in markets, the nominal interest 
rate of the bonds issued by the government of Country 2 is determined by 𝑅1,𝑡 in Country 
1.  
 The nominal interest rate 𝑅1,𝑡 is the rate of increase of the “real” obligation of 
government of Country 2 because 𝑅1,𝑡  is given exogenously for the government of 
Country 2 and has to be paid for in the currency of Country 1 regardless of inflation in 
Country 2. That is, the determinant exogenous variable for the debts of the government 
of Country 2 is not the real interest rate (𝑟𝑡) but the nominal interest rate in Country 1 (𝑅1,𝑡).  
 Here, 
   𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑅1,𝑡 − 𝜋1,𝑡 , 
 
and therefore,  
  𝑅1,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡+𝜋1,𝑡 = 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡 + 𝜋1,𝑡 . 
 
That is, the rate of increase of the real obligation of the government of Country 2 to 
lenders in Country 1 in period t is 𝑟𝑡+𝜋1,𝑡 = 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡 + 𝜋1,𝑡. This means that the real 
obligation consists of not only the real interest rate 𝑟𝑡(= 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡)  but also the 
inflation rate of Country 1 ( 𝜋1,𝑡 ). In this case, the inflation rate of Country 1 is 
exogenously given and is a real burden for the government of Country 2.  
 Because 𝜋2,𝑡 = 𝜒𝑡 + 𝜋1,𝑡 as indicated by equation (1), the rate of increase of 
the government’s real obligation (𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡 + 𝜋1,𝑡) is equivalent to 
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 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜒𝑡 . 
 
As a result, the government of Country 2 behaves so as to make the rate of increase of its 
real obligation equal to 𝛤2,𝐺 (1−𝛼𝛼 ) such that  
 𝛤𝐺,2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜒𝑡 .                                           (28) 
 
By equations (6) and (28), therefore, the government of Country 2 behaves to maintain 
 𝛤𝐺,2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜒𝑡 .          (29) 
 
 On the other hand, by equation (21), the representative household of Country 2 
behaves so as to satisfy  
 𝛤𝑃,2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) = 𝑟 = 𝑅2,𝑡 − 𝜋2,𝑡                                        (30) 
 
at steady state such that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟. 
 
2.3.3  The law of motion for the exchange rate 
Because 𝛤𝑃,2 (1−𝛼𝛼 ) is constant as indicated by equation (21), then by equation (30), 
 ∫ ∫ (𝜋1,v+𝑟v)𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = ∫ ∫ [𝜋1,v + 𝛤𝑃,2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 )]𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1  =  ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1  + 𝛤𝑃,2 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 )              (31) 
 
at steady state such that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟. By equations (29) and (31), 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜒v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜒𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2) − ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1         (32) 
 
at steady state such that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟 . Equation (32) indicates the law of motion for the 
exchange rate under the MDC-based procedure.  
 A solution of integral equation (32) is  
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𝜒𝑡 = 𝜒0 + 6 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2 − ∫ ∫ 𝜋1,v𝑠+1𝑠 𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ) exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] .      (33) 
 
If 𝜋1,v = 0 and 𝜒𝑡  satisfies equation (32) for 0 ≤ 𝑡 and −∞ < 𝜒𝑡 ≤ ∞ for −1 <𝑡 ≤ 1, then  
 lim𝑡→∞ 𝜒𝑡 = 𝜒0 + 6 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2)𝑡2 .                              (34) 
 
2.4  Identity between the two procedures 
Equations (23) and (27) indicate that equations (14) and (32), equations (15) and (33), 
and equations (16) and (34) are identical, respectively. That is, the law of motion for the 
exchange rate under the MDC-based procedure is identical to that under the RTP-based 
procedure. 
 
2.5  Independent central bank 
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, a central bank is not explicitly mentioned. However, in the model 
and in actuality, a central bank plays an important and separate role from the government 
in the determination of the exchange rate, as well as the rate of inflation. The central bank 
needs to play such a role because otherwise the depreciation of currency of Country 2 
accelerates.  
 Equations (14), (15), (16), (32), (33), and (34) indicate that if 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and 
equivalently 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2 are maintained, the depreciation of currency of Country 2 does 
not endogenously accelerate. If, however, 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2  continue, 
depreciation accelerates. Therefore, it is crucially important to keep 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2  to prevent the depreciation of Country 2’s currency from accelerating. 
However, how can the government of Country 2 maintain these equations? 
 𝜃𝐺,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2  are the government’s preferences, and they cannot easily be 
controlled by the government itself. Controlling or adjusting preferences, regardless of 
whether they are an individual’s or government’s, usually requires help from other people 
or institutions. Because it is highly likely that 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2  (see 
Harashima, 2004, 2007a, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b, 2013a), the government needs the help of 
some independent institution to achieve and maintain 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2 . 
Central banks were created to be these independent institutions. They are expected and 
delegated by the people to control the government’s preferences by forcing the 
government to maintain 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2  through the use of monetary 
policies.  
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 In this paper, a central bank is assumed to be able to be independent from the 
government and play this important role. This means that government and central bank 
can be separate and different entities and that they can behave separately according to 
their own wills. The independence of the central bank is critically important. Unless it is 
sufficiently independent, 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2  and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2  cannot be maintained, and 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2 and 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2 will remain as they are.  
 
3  INFLATION 
 
3.1  The law of motion for inflation 
3.1.1  RTP-based procedure  
By equations (1) and (14), the law of motion for inflation in Country 2 under the RTP-
based procedure is described by 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜋2,v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜋2,𝑡 + (𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2) − 𝜋1,𝑡 .                       (35) 
 
Remember that 𝜋1,𝑡 is an exogenous variable for Country 2. 
 If 𝜋1,𝑡 is constant (i.e., inflation in Country 1 is stable), and if at the same time 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2 is left as it is, then inflation and currency depreciation in Country 2 accelerate 
by equations (14) and (15). 
 
3.1.2  MDC-based procedure 
Similarly, by equations (1) and (32), the law of motion for inflation in Country 2 under 
the MDC-based procedure is described by 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜋2,v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜋2,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2) − 𝜋1,𝑡 ,                 (36) 
 
where 𝜋1,𝑡 is again an exogenous variable for Country 2. 
 If 𝜋1,𝑡 is constant and if at the same time 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2  is left as it is, then 
inflation in Country 2 accelerates and its currency depreciation accelerates by equations 
(32) and (33). 
 
3.1.3  Identity between the two procedures 
Equations (23) and (27) indicate that equations (35) and (36) are identical. That is, the 




3.2  Independent central bank 
Equations (35) and (36) indicate that if 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and equivalently 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2 are 
maintained, inflation in Country 2 does not accelerate endogenously, but if 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2 
and 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2  continue, it accelerates. Similar to the case for the exchange rate, 
therefore, it is crucially important to keep 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2 so that inflation 
in Country 2 does not accelerate. Hence, the central bank of Country 2 plays an essential 
role in controlling and stabilizing inflation, similar to the case of the exchange rate.  
 
3.3  Effect of inflation in the other country  
If 𝜋1,𝑡 = 0 (i.e., inflation in Country 1 is nil), by equation (35), 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜋2,v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜋2,𝑡 + (𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2)                                (37) 
 
and equivalently by equation (36), 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜋2,v𝑑v𝑑𝑠𝑠+1𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜋2,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2) .                        (38) 
 
In addition, by equation (37),  
 𝜋2,𝑡 = 𝜋2,0 + 6(𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2)exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] 
 
and by equation (38), 
 𝜋2,𝑡 = 𝜋2,0 + 6 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2)exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] 
 
where  
  lim𝑡→∞ 𝑧𝑡 = 2  . 
 
That is, for inflation in Country 2 neither to accelerate nor decelerate, 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2 must be maintained.  
 However, if 𝜋1,𝑡 ≠ 0 (i.e., the inflation rate in Country 1 takes some positive or 
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negative values), inflation in Country 2 (𝜋2,𝑡) is influenced by inflation in Country 1 (𝜋1,𝑡) through the channel of government borrowing in Country 2 denominated in the 
currency of Country 1 from lenders in Country 1. Equations (35) and (36) indicate that if 𝜋1,𝑡 ≠ 0, the central bank of Country 2 need not keep 𝜃𝐺,2 = 𝜃𝑃,2 and 𝛤𝐺,2 = 𝛤𝑃,2; rather 
it should keep 
 (𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2) − 𝜋1,𝑡 = 0 
 
and equivalently  
 (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2) − 𝜋1,𝑡 = 0 
 
for inflation not to accelerate. Therefore, for example, if 𝜋1,𝑡 > 0, the central bank of 
Country 2 can allow its government to enjoy 
 𝜃𝐺,2 > 𝜃𝑃,2 
 
as long as 
  𝜃𝐺,2 − 𝜃𝑃,2 ≤ 𝜋1,𝑡 , 
 
and equivalently 
 𝛤𝐺,2 > 𝛤𝑃,2 
 
as long as 
  (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) (𝛤𝐺,2 − 𝛤𝑃,2) ≤ 𝜋1,𝑡 . 
 
That is, the government of Country 2 can enjoy behaving according to its intrinsic 
preference 𝜃𝐺,2 to some extent, thanks to inflation in Country 1. 
 
4  SOVEREIGN DEFAULT 
 
4.1  Insufficiently independent central bank 
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Equations (14), (32), (35), and (36) indicate that if 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and equivalently 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 =𝛤𝑃,𝑖  are maintained, currency depreciation and domestic inflation do not accelerate 
endogenously in Country i. Therefore, even though the government of Country i borrows 
money denominated in foreign currencies, it will not matter if the central bank of Country 
i is sufficiently independent and 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 are always kept.  
 However, if the central bank is not sufficiently independent, 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 are not kept, and 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 persist, currency depreciation 
and domestic inflation will endogenously accelerate in Country i as explained in Sections 
2.4 and 3.2. The fundamental cause of acceleration, therefore, is an insufficiently 
independent central bank. 
 Note that adopting an exchange-rate peg does not necessarily guarantee 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖. Unless a truly independent central bank forces its government 
to strictly achieve and maintain 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖  (i.e., behave so as to 
maintain the exchange-rate peg), future currency depreciation and high domestic inflation 
are inevitable.  
 
4.2  Options  
The government of Country i with 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖  may leave the 
accelerating currency depreciation and inflation as they are because all of its optimality 
conditions still continue to be satisfied. However, the people in Country i will not tolerate 
this situation for a long period. They will eventually begin to demand that the government 
take action to normalize the situation. 
 One normalization option is for the government to change its preference from  𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 < 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 < 𝛤𝑃,𝑖, and then maintain them for a 
sufficiently long period of time. Notice that the preferences should be changed not to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 ; they must be modified to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 < 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 < 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 
because government debts have already excessively accumulated because of its past 
behavior, and the excessive debts have to be reduced to correct the situation (see 
Harashima, 2007c, 2008b, 2013a). After the debts are sufficiently reduced, the 
government should again change its preference from 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 < 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 < 𝛤𝑃,𝑖  to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 and then maintain these levels. Nevertheless, the necessity of 
having to first achieve and maintain 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 < 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 < 𝛤𝑃,𝑖  means that the 
government has to cut expenditures and increase taxes significantly for a long period.  
 If, however, a government has borrowed money from foreign lenders, another 
option is available. Instead of changing its preferences, the government may stop paying 
back debts to foreign lenders; that is, it could choose a sovereign default. In this case, the 
government and its people can escape the pain of lower expenditures and higher taxes at 
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least temporarily because the responsibility is shifted to foreigners. In this case, the 
necessary reductions in government expenditures and increases in taxes may be lower 
than in the case of changing preferences. Nevertheless, of course, this option is not the 
perfect alternative because foreign lenders will no doubt retaliate by whatever means are 
available. 
 Some governments with insufficiently independent central banks may choose 
this imperfect alternative option because people often greatly dislike foreign lenders and 
they may support this option. In this way, the government leaders may reduce the 
probability that they lose power compared with the option of changing the government’s 
preferences. By declaring a sovereign default, a government may escape the negative 
consequences of a correction (e.g., shrinking demand as explained in Section 5.2), at least 
temporarily, by shifting the blame to foreign lenders.  
 
4.3  The root cause of sovereign default  
The models based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) well describe what eventually pushes a 
government to make the decision to default once it reaches the point where sovereign 
default looms as an option. However, the important point here is not this last step but the 
reason the government reached this point. The model described in this paper clearly 
indicates that an insufficiently independent central bank is the root cause of sovereign 
default. 
 
4.4  Roles of shocks  
It is assumed in Section 2.1 that the exchange rate is kept equal to PPP for simplicity, but 
in reality, it will occasionally deviate substantially from PPP for a variety of reasons, for 
example, because of speculation in the exchange rate market or government interventions. 
If the exchange rate largely deviates from PPP, the probability of sovereign default in the 
future may substantially increase. For example, if the currency of Country i does not 
depreciate sufficiently for some reason even though 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 persist, 
the government of Country i may misinterpret this to mean that 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 =𝛤𝑃,𝑖 are being kept. In this case, it may not cut expenditures and raise taxes even though 
it should actually do so. A sharp currency depreciation will inevitably occur at some time, 
perhaps suddenly, because of the persistent conditions (𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖), and 
when it occurs, the unprepared government of Country i may have no choice other than a 
sovereign default. That is, an exogenous factor or shock like substantial deviation from 
PPP can trigger a sovereign default.  
 Nevertheless, the model in this paper indicates that sovereign defaults can occur 
without exogenous factors or shocks. Indeed, Tomz and Wright (2007) showed that the 
relationship between real economic activities and default is weak. An exogenous factor 
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or shock such as an exchange rate deviation may raise the probability of a sovereign 
default, but even without any exogenous factors or shocks, a substantial correction or 
adjustment will eventually be needed if 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 remain unchanged. 
In this sense, a shock could be viewed as a kind of catalyst for sovereign default in that it 
provokes a reaction that would still otherwise occur. 
 
4.5  Responsibilities of the International Monetary Fund and 
foreign lenders 
4.5.1  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
When a sovereign default occurs, the IMF usually intervenes. The measures used to settle 
a case are wide-ranging. However, the most important measure the IMF should take is to 
ensure that the central bank of the defaulting country is kept sufficiently independent. A 
mere formal declaration of its independence is not sufficient action. An institutional 
mechanism through which the central bank’s independence is maintained is necessary.  
 As discussed in Section 4.1, introducing an exchange-rate peg is not sufficient 
to prevent a future sovereign default. The central bank must be able to actually force the 
government to maintain the exchange-rate peg. 
 
4.5.2  Foreign lenders 
It seems likely that foreign lenders can expect the possibility of 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 >𝛤𝑃,𝑖 when they decide to lend money to the government of Country i; that is, they should 
be able to anticipate that the central bank of Country i is not sufficiently independent. 
Furthermore, some foreign lenders make the loans (i.e., take the risks) fully aware of the 
risks associated with 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 to obtain high returns. That is, they are 
not completely innocent in the sense that they lend money to obtain the higher returns. 
Hence, foreign lenders bear some of the responsibility for the default, and the IMF should 
consider this point when it settles cases of sovereign default. 
 
5  IMPACT ON REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
 
5.1  Sustainable heterogeneity (SH) 
It is highly likely that not only the preferences of government but also those of the 
representative household are heterogeneous across countries; that is, not only 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 ≠ 𝜃𝐺,𝑗 
and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 ≠ 𝛤𝐺,𝑗  but also 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 ≠ 𝜃𝑃,𝑗  and 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 ≠ 𝛤𝑃,𝑗 . Therefore, extreme economic 
inequalities among countries can emerge as Becker (1980) predicted. However, 
Harashima (2010, 2014a, 2017b) showed that SH can be achieved if an authority 
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appropriately intervenes and transfers money among heterogeneous households, where 
SH means that all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied. In 
addition, Harashima (2015) showed that, under floating exchange rates, an international 
SH (i.e., SH among heterogeneous countries) is naturally achieved.  
 An international SH under floating exchange rates still holds even if the 
governments of heterogeneous countries borrow money denominated in foreign 
currencies from foreign lenders. This is true because the mechanism by which an 
international SH is achieved is irrelevant to the mechanism of accelerations in currency 
depreciation and domestic inflation resulting from 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖  (see 
Harashima, 2015).  
 
5.2  Impact of the correction in real terms 
Whether the government of Country i chooses the option of sovereign default or not, it 
eventually has to correct its preference from 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 
and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 to stop the acceleration of currency depreciation and inflation. In this 
sense, a sovereign default does not represent a final settlement. It only temporarily 
postpones the actual correction (i.e., a significant decrease in demand).  
 As explained in Section 4.2, simply adjusting preferences from 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 > 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 > 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 does not end the need for a correction. The 
relationships must change to 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 < 𝜃𝑃,𝑖  and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 < 𝛤𝑃,𝑖 and be maintained at those 
levels for some period of time.  
 In the correction, government expenditures are reduced and taxes are raised 
substantially because, as equation (24) indicates, it is necessary to make the value  
 − g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡  
 
at steady state smaller than it was before the correction. Therefore, (g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡) at steady 
state must be less than it was before, and 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 at steady state must also become smaller. 
To achieve this goal at the ex post steady state, (g𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡) has to be kept very small 
(probably negative) during the period before reaching the ex post steady state. As a result, 
the overall demand in the economy will shrink significantly and a severe recession will 
be generated.  
 An important point is that the production (supply) capacity at the macro level is 
not affected by the correction because the quantities of technology, labor, and capital 
inputs are not changed by the correction. On the other hand, the demands for some 
products are significantly affected; for example, government demand for some products 
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will decrease to nearly zero and the production (supply) of these products will also have 
to decrease significantly. That is, the demand and supply structure in the economy should 
be restructured or adjusted to one that corresponds to the government’s adjusted behavior 
to maintain 𝜃𝐺,𝑖 = 𝜃𝑃,𝑖 and 𝛤𝐺,𝑖 = 𝛤𝑃,𝑖. This restructuring will take time, and during the 
adjustment period, a severe recession due to the imbalance between demand and supply 
will persist until the economy is eventually normalized. 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is very useful for analyzing the borrowing 
behavior of the government of a sovereign country, but it is not sufficiently useful for 
examining the root cause of sovereign default. Their model predicts that a sovereign 
default cannot emerge unless an expected exogenous shock occurs; essentially, the root 
cause of sovereign default is bad luck. However, sovereign defaults occurred far more 
frequently and, in some cases, serially in emerging countries than in developed countries 
even though luck should be distributed equally among emerging and developed countries.   
 In addition, the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) ignores the effects of 
currency depreciation and domestic inflation although sovereign defaults usually are 
accompanied by episodes of significant currency depreciation and high inflation. 
Uribe (2006) emphasized the roles of prices and the exchange rate in sovereign defaults 
and showed that the risk of sovereign default will greatly differ depending on monetary-
fiscal regimes. However, Uribe (2006) does not offer a micro-foundation of government 
behavior, and the behaviors of the government and the central bank are not separated.  
 In this paper, I examine the cause of sovereign default on the basis of a model of 
inflation that is built on a micro-foundation of government behavior (Harashima 2004, 
2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b, 2013a, 2019a, 2019b). In addition, the 
behaviors of the government and central bank are fully separated. The root cause of 
sovereign default was found to be an insufficiently independent central bank. Because the 
preferences of the government and the representative household are basically intrinsically 
heterogeneous, if these heterogeneous preferences are left unchanged because the central 
bank is not sufficiently independent, the government will borrow money excessively, 
resulting in accelerating currency depreciation and inflation. These poor conditions will 
frustrate and anger its citizens, and the government may eventually declare a sovereign 
default to at least temporarily transfer the blame to foreign lenders.  
 It seems likely that the central banks of many emerging countries are less 
independent than those of developed countries (see e.g. Cukierman et al., 1992); therefore, 
the model in this paper predicts that the probability of sovereign default in emerging 
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countries will be higher than that of developed countries. Moreover, a sovereign default 
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